This paper concerns the asymmetric atomic selfish routing game for load balancing in ring networks. In the selfish routing, each player selects a path in the ring network to route one unit traffic between its source and destination nodes, aiming at a minimum maximum link load along its own path. The selfish path selections by individuals ignore the system objective of minimizing the maximum load over all network links. This selfish ring load (SRL) game arises in a wide variety of applications in decentralized network routing, where network performance is often measured by the price of anarchy (PoA), the worst-case ratio between the maximum link loads in an equilibrium routing and an optimal routing. It has been known that the PoA of SRL with respect to classical Nash equilibrium cannot be upper bounded by any constant, showing large loss of efficiency at some Nash equilibrium outcome.
Introduction
For decades, it has been the responsibility of the network central authority to route traffic and all network participants are assumed to obey the protocol. However, modern networks usually operate at a scale that makes the use of centralized protocols challenging. Thus, recent trends in the design and analysis of network routing take into account the rational behaviors of selfish network users. Among many others, selfish routing (Roughgarden and Tardos 2002) models network routing from a game-theoretic perspective, in which network users are viewed as self-interested strategic players participating in a competitive game. Each player, with his own pair of source and destination nodes in the network, aims to establish a communication path (between his source and destination) along which he experiences latency or bottleneck congestion as low as possible. This paper concerns with the latter objective, and studies selfish routing in ring networks on maximum load (referred to as SRL) in which both individual players and the central authority wish to minimize their own maximum link loads. Our study focuses on ring networks since ring has been a fundamental topology frequently encountered in communication networks, and attracted considerable attention and efforts from the research community (Muñoz et al. 2011; Bentza et al. 2009; Anshelevich and Zhang 2008; Chen et al. 2010; Cheng 2004; Wang 2005; Blum et al. 2001; Schrijver et al. 1998) .
Our study on SRL is inspired by the end-to-end packet delivery in communication networks, where each packet is to be delivered along a path greedily selected by its corresponding player without considering the system-wide criteria. In heavily congested networks, the delay of a packet is governed by the bottleneck congestion (the maximum link load) the packet experiences (Busch and Magdon-Ismail 2009) . From a systemic perspective, the performance of a communication network is closely related to the performance of its most congested link (Banner and Orda 2007; Cole et al. 2006; Qiu et al. 2006) , especially when robustness to bursty traffic (Banerjee and Yoo 1997) or to growing demand (Wang and Wang 1999 ) is a priority.
In the absence of a central authority which can impose and maintain globally efficient routing strategies on network traffic, network designers are often interested in a stable outcome that is as close to the system optimum as possible. The most popular solution concept of Nash Equilibrium (NE) refers to the stable state from which no individual would deviate unilaterally. Given a certain social cost that measures the network performance (e.g., the overall maximum link load in SRL), the efficiency of NE is often quantified by Price of Anarchy (PoA) and Price of Stability (PoS), which are the worst-case ratio and the best-case ratio, respectively, between the social costs in a NE and in a globally optimal solution (Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou 1999; Anshelevich et al. 2009 ). Although the selfish routing in general networks on maximum load (referred to as SL) always admits NE, its PoA can grow linearly with the size of network; the known worst case of SL appears in ring networks (Busch and Magdon-Ismail 2009 ). This suggests a natural starting point -SRL, for improving SL games. Good resolution for SRL may provide insights for pursing nice outcomes in SL.
While NE is a powerful tool for predicting outcomes in competitive environments, its notion of stability applies only to unilateral deviations under the assumption that users (players) are completely non-cooperative, isolated entities in networks (games), acting not only selfishly but also independently. However, in numerous competitive situations, given today's communication infrastructure, a group of selfish users may and does coordinate a joint deviation if it is profitable to all the members of the group (Procaccia and Rosenschein 2006) : businesses agree to cooperate for mutual benefits, and agents contract bilaterally or multilaterally to take joint actions for common efficiency (Arcaute et al. 2009 ). In these more realistic situations that allow some level of coordination, the NE is not necessarily sustainable in that it may not reflect Related work Our SRLC model generalizes the SRL game, which is the restriction of SL to ring networks. The PoA of SL for general networks is smaller than 2(ℓ + n), where ℓ stands for the length of the longest path a player may select and n stands for the number of network nodes (Busch and Magdon-Ismail 2009) . The worst case of SL discovered so far occurs in rings, where the PoA can be both as high as n − 1. The authors also conjectured that the matching upper bound on the PoA of SL in general networks equals the length of the longest cycle in the network minus 1, which equals both n − 1 and ℓ − 1 for ring networks.
Because cooperation among autonomous players may be mutually beneficial even if the players selfishly try to optimize their own objectives, the PoA and PoS arguably conflate the effects of selfishness (which is still reserved in SE) and lack of coordination (which disappears in SE). For this reason, Andelman et al. (2009) refined the measures to be k-Strong Price of Anarchy (k-SPoA) and k-Strong Price of Stability (k-SPoS) with respect to the so called k-Strong Equilibrium (k-SE) that is a strategy profile in which no coalition of size at most k has any joint deviation beneficial to all members. To be precise, the k-SPoA (resp. k-SPoS) is defined as the ratio of the social cost in the worst (resp. best) k-SE to that in a global optimum. The concept of k-SE generalizes both NE (which is a 1-SE) and SE (which is an m-SE in m-player games). Following convention, the "k-" is often omitted from the notions when integer k equals the number of players in the game.
Employing k-SE has a potential to reduce the PoA, since every k-SE is a NE but not vice versa. In the extreme case of SE where k equals the number of players, it has been shown that the SPoA is significantly lower than the PoA in many settings of competitive games (see, e.g., Albers 2009; Andelman et al. 2009 ). Nevertheless, SE mainly make sense in small networks where players have substantial information about the overall structures and can coordinate their actions (Jackson 2005) . Emergent efforts have been devoted to investigating k-SE for general k. It was shown that the k-SPoA falls in [
] for job scheduling game with l(≤ k) unrelated machines and m jobs (Andelman et al. 2009; Fiat et al. 2007) , and falls in [max{
for fair connection game with m players (Albers 2009; Epsteina et al. 2009 ). Albeit these efforts, for small k the existing results on k-SE are not so attractive in the aspect of practical applications. Even worse situations happen in some setting of the network creation game where no k-SE exists for any k ≥ 3 (Andelman et al. 2009 ).
Concerning the major downside of the demanding SE, various works have studied its existence in particular families of games (Albers 2009; Andelman et al. 2009; Epsteina et al. 2009; Holzman and Law-yone 2003, etc.) . Closely related to our SRLC model is the recent introduction of π-Lexicographic Improvement Property (π-LIP) by Harks et al. (2009) . They showed that games of π-LIP always possess SE, and identified so called bottleneck congestion games, which enjoy the π-LIP and include job scheduling (Andelman et al. 2009 ), SL (Busch and Magdon-Ismail 2009 ) and hence SRLC (this paper) as special cases.
While our SRLC model, as well as k-SE, works with dynamic coalitions, other different approaches have been taken to study the effect of coalition formation in network games based on static coalitions which are formed according to an exogenous partition over the set of players (Cominetti et al. 2006; Harks 2009; Hayrapetyan et al. 2006) . Under certain settings, the quality of the solution can deteriorate by an arbitrarily high factor in the presence of static coalitions.
In addition to the number of coalition members, other natural restrictions have been imposed to admissible coalitions in efforts to improve the quality of outcomes in the decentralized setting. Leonardi and Sankowski (2007) studied how the PoA and PoS of network formation games with Sharpley cost allocation are affected by allowing locally coordinated coalitions of players, where a group of players can form a coalition if they share a link. This kind of local cooperation does not necessarily lead to better PoA, and increases PoS from Θ(log m) to Θ(m) in m-player games. Along a different line of network formation, Jackson and Wolinsky (2005; 1996) proposed pairwise stability, a variant of 2-SE, to investigate the (in)compatibility of overall societal welfare with incentives of self-interested individuals to form and sever network links. Some connection between pairwise stability and 2-SE was recently established by Calvó-Armengol andİlkılıç (2009).
Our contributions Henceforth, we restrict our attention to SRLC, and will often omit the reference to SRLC in our presentation. We prove that when coordination within coalitions of size up to 3 is allowed, the PoA of equilibrium outcomes drops from n − 1 (linear in the ring size n) to constant 2. More specifically, we establish 3-SPoA = 2 against PoA ≥ 2-SPoA = n − 1. Hence, using coordination in 2-and 3-player coalitions, we achieve a significant improvement in terms of the PoA, compared to noncooperative and pairwise coordination environments. Few selfish routing models in literature enjoy such an interesting property as SRLC: small-sized coalitions can greatly improve not only the gains of individual players but also the performance of the whole network.
We also show that the m-SPoA ∈ [1 + 2 m , 2] is strictly greater than 1, and the k-SPoA
is at most 2, where k ≥ 3 and ε > 0 can be arbitrarily small. We strengthen the existence of SE by showing that every optimal routing in SRLC is a SE. Since an optimal routing for SRLC is derivable in polynomial time (Wang 2005) , an immediate algorithmic corollary says that a SE in SRLC can be found in O(m log m) time and in O(m) time when m ≥ n.
Paper organization In Section 2, we first define the SRLC model mathematically; then we show that every optimal routing of SRLC is a SE, yielding the existence of k-SE and k-SPoS = 1 for every k. In Section 3, we obtain lower bounds of k-SPoA exhibited by concrete examples:
for m > k ≥ 3 and SPoA ≥ 1 + 2/m. In Section 4, we derive upper bounds on k-SPoA: n−1 for k ≤ 2, and 2 for all k ≥ 3; in particular we establish 3-PoA = 2 and complement the result with PoA = 2-SPoA = n − 1. In Section 5, we conclude the paper with discussion on future work.
Model
Our model of Selfish Ring Load with Collusion (SRLC) is specified by triple I= (R, (s j , t j ) m j=1 , k), which is called a SRLC instance or SRLC k instance to emphasize that up to k players can form a coalition. As illustrated in Figure 1(a) , the underlying network of I is a ring R = (V, E) with node-set V = {v i | i = 1, 2, . . . , n} and link-set 
equal the number of routes in {Q 1 , Q 2 , . . . , Q m } each going through e. The integrality of link loads will be used explicitly or implicitly in this paper. Correspondingly, a subgraph P of R (written as P ⊆ R) and its link set E(P ) bear the maximum load
In a mild abuse of notation, we shall identify graph P with its link set E(P ) when no confusion arises; particularly, we often abbreviate e ∈ E(P ) to e ∈ P . The maximum loads experienced by player j ∈ [m], and by the ring (the routing π) are
When referring to the maximum load of a player, a path, or the ring, we often omit the term "maximum" for short. To emphasize that a (maximum) load is experienced in routing π, we often call this load as a π-load. A routing π * for I is optimal if π * R is minimum among all routings for I. The problem of finding π * is a special case of the ring loading problem with integer demand splitting, which could be solved in a polynomial time (Wang 2005) . By a coalition we mean a set of players. In I = (R, (s j , t j ) m j=1 , k), only coalitions of at most k players are allowed to form, where integer k ∈ [m]. Given a routing π for I, the deviation by a coalition S (from π refers to the change of the π-routes of all players in S. We say that π is (resp. is not) resilient to the deviation by (coalition) S if the deviation does not decrease the load of at least one player in S (resp. decreases the loads of all players in S). Routing π is called a k-Strong Equilibrium (k-SE) if π is resilient to the deviation by any coalition of at most k players. By definition, a k-SE is an h-SE for all h ∈ [k], and 1-SE is exactly the classical Nash Equilibrium (NE). Therefore every k-SE π = {Q 1 , Q 2 , . . . , Q m } of I is a NE, and it is resilient to the deviation by coalition {j} of a single player, satisfying the following NE inequalities:
An m-SE is identical with the classical Strong Equilibrium (SE). Since SRLC falls within the general framework of the bottleneck congestion game, it possesses so called π-Lexicographical Improvement Property, which implies the existence of SE ); so every SRLC k instance admits at least one k-SE. Conversely, the strong stability of optimal routings established below strengthens this existence.
Theorem 2.1. Every optimal routing in SRLC is a SE.
Proof. Suppose on the contrary that there exists an optimal routing
In competitive games where SE exists and an initial solution could be imposed centrally, SE is usually a preferable candidate for the initial setting. Nevertheless, computing SE is in general prohibitive due to its NP-completeness. In contrast, given a SRLC instance, its optimal routing is derivable by Wang's (2005) algorithm for the ring loading problem with integer demand splitting. The algorithm in combination with Theorem 2.1 implies the following polynomial time solvability of computing SE in SRLC.
Corollary 2.2. A SE in SRLC can be found in O(m log m) time and in O(m) time when m ≥ n.
Let π * be an optimal routing for SRLC k instance I. The k-Strong Price of Anarchy (kSPoA) of I is defined as the minimum value β such that π R /π * R ≤ β holds for every k-SE π of I. The k-Strong Price of Stability (k-SPoS) of I is defined as the minimum value β such that π R /π * R ≤ β holds for some k-SE π of I. The notion of the k-SPoA (resp. k-SPoS) extends to the SRLC k problem of all SRLC k instances, whose k-SPoA (resp. k-SPoS) is set to be the supremum of k-SPoA (resp. k-SPoS) over all SRLC k instances. Note that 1-SPoA is the same as the standard PoA (Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou 1999) , and m-SPoA is often abbreviated to SPoA. Clearly,
The string of inequalities and Theorem 2.1 give the following immediate corollary. 
Lower Bounds on Price of Anarchy of SRLC
In this section, we will establish several lower bounds on k-SPoA of SRLC via concrete SRLC k instances. Let us begin with an example from Busch and Magdon-Ismail (2009) .
It is easy to check that the unique optimal routing π * for I 2 with π * R = 1 consists of n routes each of one link, and a 2-SE π for I 2 with π R = n − 1 consists of n routes each of n − 1 links. (See Figure 1 (b, c) for an illustration with n = 4.) Hence, using NE inequalities (2.2), we obtain the following observation.
For the setting of I 2 , it is not hard to see that permitting coalitions of sizes at most 3 guarantees that 3-NE must be the unique optimal routing. To study k-SPoA of SRLC k for k ≥ 3, we need more complicated settings. 
Proof. Let π and π ′ denote the two routings for I k,ℓ in which every player j ∈ [m] adopts longer route Q j with |E(Q j )| = (k − 1)ℓ − 1 and shorter routeQ j with |E(Q j )| = (k − 2)ℓ, respectively. It is easy to see that
Suppose otherwise. Then there exists coalition S ⊆ [m] with |S| ≤ k such that π is not resilient to the deviation by S. Let π ′′ be the routing obtained from π via the deviation by S. Then for any fixed player s ∈ S, its π ′′ -load is lower than its π-load, saying
For any e ∈ E, let λ e ≡ |{j | e ∈ Q j , j ∈ S}| (resp.λ e ≡ |{j | e ∈Q j , j ∈ S}|) denote the number of players in S whose π-routes (resp. π ′′ -routes) contain e. 
The (in)equalities in (3.1) and (3.2) assure the following upper bounds onλ e for all e ∈ E = E(Q s ∪Q s ):λ 
In the following we will see that no matter whether |S| is odd or even, the inequalities in (3.4) give a violation ∑ e∈Eλ e < |S|(k − 2)ℓ of (3.3).
Case 1: |S| is odd. We haveλ e ≤
|S|−1 2
for all e ∈ E, and the violation as
Case 2: |S| is even. We haveλ e ≤ ⌊ |S|−1
for all e ∈ Q s , yielding
The violation is implied by
It remains to show 2k − |S| ≥ 4. This is clearly true because k ≥ 3, k ≥ |S|, and |S| is an even number. Theorem 3.1 will be used in Section 4 to establish lower bound 2 on the 3-SPoA of SRLC. Moreover, from the theorem we see that for every k ≥ 3 there is an instance I k,ℓ with k-SPoA > 1. Note that in I k,ℓ the largest coalition size k is at most 3/5 of the number of players m. Can one expect that k-SPoA approaches 1 as k turns to m? The answer is negative, as shown by the following SRLC m instance whose SPoA > 1 for the extreme case of k = m.
There are an even number m ≥ 4 of players. Ring R has size n = 2m − 2. Player 1 has source s 1 = v 1 and destination t 1 = v 2 ; player j ∈ [m]\{1} has source s j = v (j−2)(m−2)+1 (mod n) and destination t j = v (j−2)(m−2)+m (mod n) . (See Figure 3 for an illustration.)
In our discussion on SRLC m instance J m , we suppose that nodes v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v n are encountered in this order when traversing R in a clockwise direction, and that Q j is the route from s j to t j routed clockwise for j = 1, 2, · · · , m. Observe that player 1 is very special in that its route can be very "short" Q 1 of one link or very "long"Q 1 of 2m − 3 link, while the both paths of other players are always of m − 1 links (half length of the ring). As the following lemma shows, depending on whether player 1 chooses its shorter path or longer path, any other player experiences maximum load at least m/2 or at least m/2 + 1.
, let e and f denote the two end links of
Since e ∈ P j and m is an even number, we see that 
(3.6)
Let U denote the set of players whose source is v i for some odd i ∈ [3, m − 1]. Then U ∩ S = ∅ because e 1 ̸ ∈ Q j ∋ e m for every j ∈ U . It follows that from π to π ′′ all players in U remains unchanged, and their routes Q j (j ∈ U ) in both π and π ′′ all contain e m . In addition to players in U , by (3.6) all players j ∈ S have their π ′′ -routesQ j go through e m . So 
Upper Bounds on Price of Anarchy of SRLC
The upper bounds to be established in this section imply that the 2-SPoA and 3-SPoA of the SRLC problem are n − 1 and 2, respectively.
Upper bounds
Recall from Lemma 3.1 that the both PoA and 2-SPoA of SRLC is at least n − 1. A general bound in Busch and Magdon-Ismail (2009) implies PoA < 2(n − 1 + log n). The O(n) additive gap between the upper and lower bounds is bridged by the following theorem. 
If there is a link g ∈ E \{f } such that π[g] < (n−1)Λ * , then it follows from NE inequalities
On the other hand, as |E(Q j )| ≤ n − 1 for all j ∈ [m], we see that
. However, since the π * -route of each player contributes at least 1 to the total load ∑ e∈E π * [e] on the ring, we have
Notice that Theorem 4.1 excludes the possibility of obtaining constant upper bounds on PoA and 2-SPoA of SRLC. In contrast, upper bound 2 will be established for 3-SPoA.
Theorem 4.2. For the SRLC k problem with
The technical proof of Theorem 4.2 is left to the next subsection. Now we present an immediate corollary of Theorems 3.1 and 4.2, which implies exact value 2 of 3-SPoA for SRLC. 
Proof of Theorem 4.2
The whole subsection is devoted to proving Theorem 4.2. In view of the string of inequalities (2.2), to prove the theorem, we only need to show that 3-SPoA ≤ 2. By contradiction, we suppose on the contrary: there exists a SRLC 3 instance I = (R, (s j , t j ) m j=1 , 3) satisfying the following.
Assumption 1. Instance I admits a 3-NE
Given any coalition S of players, by π S we mean the routing for I obtained from π by changing Q j toQ j for all j ∈ S. By Assumption 1, π must be resilient to the deviation by coalition S of at most three players. This is equivalent to the following.
Proposition 2. For any coalition S ⊆ [m] with |S| ≤ 3, there exists at least one player
Our approach is to derive a coalition S contradicting to Proposition 2. The contradiction to the stability of π will establish Theorem 4.2. As usual, for any subgraphs G 1 and G 2 of R,
Observe from Assumption 1 that players who adopt different routes in π and π * are 1, . . . , ℓ. They play an important role in our proof, because they give us a way to compare π and π * . We call them switching players. The players of coalition S, which would deviate and thus contradict Proposition 2, will be selected from the set [ℓ] of switching players.
We briefly sketch the idea behind our arguments. (More detailed intuitions are given in the corresponding subsections to facilitate understanding on technical propositions and claims over there.) Intuitively, switching players of hight π-loads and their π-routes jointly cover the whole ring R are more likely to form the deviating coalition S as desired.
Due to the large difference π R −π * R ≥ Λ * +1, there must exist a large number ℓ of switching players (cf. (4.1)) who go through all of most congested links in π (cf. (4.2)). Furthermore using (contradiction deduced from) unilateral deviation, we obtain a pair of switching players whose π-routes jointly cover the ring R (see Claim 4).
In order to "assure" this pair of players of high incentives to deviate, among all candidates, we choose a pair such that their π-routes are as long as possible. Suppose that switching players 1 and ℓ form such a pair (cf. (4.3) and (4.4)). Using bilateral deviation of 1 and ℓ, we obtain a most congested link e ∈Q ℓ ⊆ Q 1 with π[e] = Λ ≥ 2Λ * + 1 and (second) most congested link e ′ ∈Q 1 ⊆ Q ℓ with π[e ′ ] ≥ Λ − 1 (cf. Claim 7 and Figure 4(a) ). In particular, player 1 experiences the maximum π-load Λ at e, and is considered as a bottleneck player.
In addition to the highly congested links e and e ′ , we find more links of high loads (at least Λ − 2) in π which are contained inQ 1 ∪Q ℓ (cf. Claim 8 and (4.8)). These links (whose set is written as F ) help us to identify players in coalition S in an efficient way: given any three links in F one of which has π-load at least Λ − 1, they are all used in π and avoided in π * by some switching player (cf. Proposition 11).
By this property of F , the highly congested links e, e ′ of π-loads ≥ Λ − 1, and the choices switching players 1, ℓ (their π-routes covering R are as long as possible), we discover the other two heavily loaded switching players 2 and 3 such that their π-routes both contain all F -links onQ 1 , and jointly contain all links onQ ℓ of loads at least Λ − 1 (cf. Figure 5(a) , Claims 14 and 17). In particular, ring R are covered by π-routes of players 1, 2, and 3 together.
Subsequently, we show that players 2 and 3 are also bottlenecks with maximum π-load (cf. Claims 18 and 19). Finally, the bottleneck players 1, 2 and 3 would form the desired coalition S showing a trilateral deviation and a contradiction to Proposition 2.
Sections 4.2.1, 4.2.2, 4.2.3 below are devoted to discussing unilateral, bilateral and trilateral deviations, respectively.
Unilateral deviations
For any most congested link e with π[e] = π R ≥ 2Λ * + 1 as in Assumption 1, it is clear that
Hence there are a "large" number ℓ ≥ Λ * + 1 of switching players, and their π-routes jointly cover all of most congested links in π. For the 3-SE π, NE inequalities (2.1) restated below correspond to the case of |S| = 1 in Proposition 2.
Further to the coverage of ∪ j∈ [ℓ] Q j over all of most congested links, using unilateral deviation, i.e., Proposition 3, we show that the whole ring is covered by π-routes of some pair of switching players.
Claim 4. There exist switching players
Proof. Let e with π[e] = π R ≥ 2Λ * + 1 be the most congested link as in Assumption 1. Since e ∈ ∪ j∈ [ℓ] Q j by (4.2), we assume without loss of generality that e ∈ Q 1 . It follows from Proposition 3 that there exists link e ′ ∈Q 1 with π[ Since the π-routes of all players in J meet at e and e ′ , the "large" size ≥ Λ * + 1 of J implies the coverage of the ring R by π-routes two players in {1} ∪ J, proving the claim.
Suppose otherwise: Q j ∪ Q l ̸ = R for every j, l ∈ {1} ∪ J. ThenQ 1 Q j for every j ∈ J. By the positions of e and e ′ on R (cf. Figure 4(a) ), one of end links ofQ 1 , written as f , is disjoint from Q j , i.e., f ∈Q j , for all j ∈ J. However, since J ⊆ [ℓ], it follows thatQ j ∈ π * for all j ∈ J, and π * [f ] ≥ |J| ≥ Λ * + 1, which is absurd as
As a corollary of the above proof, we see that for any pair of links f, g ∈ E of total π-load π[f ] + π[g] ≥ 4Λ * + 1, the set {j ∈ [ℓ] | {e, f } ⊆ Q j } contains Λ * + 1 switching players whose π-routes all go through f and g.
Bilateral deviations
By convention E ′ △E ′′ = (E ′ \ E ′′ ) ∪ (E ′′ \ E ′ ) denotes the symmetric difference of sets E ′ and E ′′ . For any subgraphs G 1 and G 2 of R, by G 1 △G 2 we mean the graph spanned by links in E(G 1 )△E(G 2 ); by G 1 \E(G 2 ) we mean the graph obtained G 1 by removing E(G 1 ) ∩ E(G 2 ). We assume π[∅] to be 0, meaning that the empty set ∅ experiences no load. Similarly, if a subgraph G of R has no link, then π[G] ≡ 0.
The following technical result will be repeatedly used in our discussion on bilateral deviation; its proof shows a violation of Proposition 2 with |S| = 2.
Proposition 5. For any pair of distinct players
. Considering the routing π ′ = π {p,q} , we have By Claim 4, suppose without loss generality that switching players 1 and ℓ have their π-routes Q 1 and Q ℓ jointly cover R. Intuitively, this coverage of R is likely to motivate a bilateral deviation by {1, ℓ}. To strengthen such an incentive, we choose such pair of players 1, ℓ with Q 1 and Q ℓ being as long as possible. To be more specific,
and the most congested link, with π-load
The minimality of |E(Q 1 )| + |E(Q ℓ )| and the coverage Q 1 ∪ Q ℓ = R guarantee that neither Q 1 nor Q ℓ is a proper subpath of any switching player's π-route.
to prevent joint deviation of players 1 and ℓ, their alternative paths bear very high π-loads as specified below. 
Trilateral deviations
At this point, considering the most congested link e with π[e] = Λ ≥ 2Λ * + 1, the (second) most congested link e ′ with π[e ′ ] ≥ Λ − 1, and the pair of switching players 1, ℓ is not enough for us to derive a contradiction. To identify more candidates for coalition S, we need more links of high π-loads (see part I and the link set F over there), as well as switching players covering these links (see part II and the player set K over there). The final contradiction (trilateral deviation) is reached in part III.
I. Highly congested links
Reasonably, we decrease the "threshold" Λ−1 of {e, e ′ } a little bit to Λ − 2, and investigate its superset
As depicted in Figure 4 (a), let R 1 and R 2 denote the t 1 -s ℓ path and t ℓ -s 1 path on R separated by the link-disjoint pathsQ 1 andQ ℓ (the π * -routes of switching players 1 and ℓ) such that R is link-disjoint union of R 1 ,Q 1 , R 2 ,Q ℓ , and the four paths are on R in cyclic order. Let shortest subpaths H 1 and H ℓ ofQ 1 andQ ℓ jointly covering all links in F (cf. Figure  4 (b)) be specified as follows:
, where for j = 1, ℓ, H j is the shortest subpath ofQ j containing F ∩Q j , the end links g j and h j of H j belong to F , and
In search for more candidate players for coalition S, we wish to find switching players whose π-routes cover highly congested links as many as possible, because these players are more likely to be instable. If some player has its π-route contain H 1 ∪ H ℓ , and thus all links of F , then it would be able to form a coalition with players 1 and ℓ, and deviate from π for lower load, contradicting the stability of π. The next claim and its proof give a formal discussion. Figure 4 (b). It follows from Claim 9 that
Claim 10. There does not exist player
Observe that link e with π[e] = Λ belongs to Figure 4) , giving
Comparing routing π ′ ≡ π {1,ℓ,t} and routing π (cf. Figure 4(b) ), we see that (4.8)
in Claim 8 suggests us to look for a switching player whose π-route could cover f 1 , f 2 , f 3 whenever possible. Intuitively, there are ℓ switching players in total. If every switching player has its π-route avoid, and thus its π * -route contain, one of
The following proposition makes the idea precise.
Proposition 11. Given any triple of distinct links
Proof. It suffices to prove (i). An equivalent condition of (i) reads: for every switching player
, from the difference between π and π * in Assumption 1, we derive
It is clear from E(Q 1 ∩Q ℓ ) = ∅ that each of f 1 , f 2 , f 3 ∈ F ⊆Q 1 ∪Q ℓ is contained in exactly one of Q 1 and Q ℓ , and in exactly one ofQ 1 andQ ℓ , implying The combination of Proposition 11 and Claim 10 is often used to derive more highly congested links in F ; particularly, we show |F ∩ H 1 | ≥ 2 as an improvement over |F | ≥ 3 in (4.8).
Claim 12. The end links g 1 and h 1 of H 1 are different, and both belong to F ∩Q 1 (cf. Figure  5(a,b) ).
by Claim 9, the end links g ℓ of h ℓ of path H ℓ are different by F ⊆ H 1 ∪ H ℓ in Claim 9 and |F | ≥ 3. Applying Proposition 11(ii) with e ′ , g ℓ , h ℓ in place of f 1 , f 2 , f 3 , respectively, we obtain a player t ∈ [ℓ − 1]\{1} whose π-route Q t contains {e ′ , g ℓ , h ℓ }. Since H 1 ∪ H ℓ Q t by Claim 10, it must be the case that Q ℓ is a subpath of Q t (cf. Figure 4) , which contradicts Claim 6. Therefore |F ∩Q 1 | ≥ 2. The statement follows from Claim 9.
II. Heavily loaded players
Since Claim 10 has excluded the possibility for us to find any candidate player of S whose π-route covers all links of F in way of covering H 1 ∪ H ℓ , the next best option is to look for some switching player whose π-route could cover H 1 and part of H ℓ . A starting point is considering the set K of switching players whose π-routes go through the end links g 1 , h 1 of H 1 and some link onQ ℓ of load at least Λ − 2:
Obviously, 1, ℓ ̸ ∈ K as {g 1 , h 1 } ⊆Q 1 by Claim 9 and E(Q 1 ∩Q ℓ ) = ∅ by (4.3). Note from Claims 8 and 12 that e, g 1 , h 1 ∈ F , Since π[e] = Λ, we may apply Proposition 11(ii) with e, g 1 , h 1 in place of f 1 , f 2 , f 3 , and obtain the existence of a player j ∈ [ℓ − 1]\{1} whose π-route Q j contains e, g 1 , h 1 . It is easy to see that this player j belongs to K as e ∈Q ℓ .
For any j ∈ K, the definition of K says E(Q j ∩Q ℓ ) ̸ = ∅. Since Q j cannot properly contain Q ℓ by Claim 6, we see that Q j must intersectQ ℓ "continuously" at a single path in stead of two or more.
Roughly, to choose a candidate player of S from K, it is natural to think of a player in K, say player 2, whose π-route Q 2 has a longest intersection withQ ℓ , which may imply more links of F covered by Q 2 and hence high incentive for player 2 to deviate together with other players. Since H 1 ⊆ Q 2 by Claim 13(i), symmetry allows us to assume that path R 2 is internally contained by Q 2 (see Figures 4(a) and 5(a) ). 
Proof. π[Q 1 ∩Q 2 ] ≤ Λ − 3 follows from Claim 13(ii), and subsequently π[Q 1 △Q 2 ] = Λ follows from Proposition 5.
Next we investigate the possibility of trilateral deviation by players 1, 2, ℓ. To prevent their coalitional deviating,Q ℓ ∩Q 2 has to contain some link of π-load at least Λ − 1.
Proof. Comparing routing π (see Figure 5 (a)) and routing π ′ = π {1,2,ℓ} (see Figure 5 (b)), we observe that
, and in turn
As e ∈Q ℓ with π[e] = Λ cannot be contained in
= Λ for j = 1, 2, which in combination with (4.13) and (4.12) gives π j = Λ > Λ−1 ≥ π ′ j for j = 1, 2, ℓ, a contradiction to Proposition 2 with S = {1, 2, ℓ}.
Recall from Assumption 1 that Λ
It follows from Claim 13(iii) that Q 2 has a unique end, say t 2 , inQ ℓ such that Q 2 ∩Q ℓ is s ℓ -t 2 path avoiding node t ℓ (see Figure 5(a) Figure 5(a,b) .)
From Claim 12, we see that {g, g 1 , h 1 } ⊆ F and further that Proposition 11(ii) applies with g, g 1 , h 1 in place of f 1 , f 2 , f 3 , respectively. Hence there exists a switching player in [ℓ − 1]\{1} whose π-route goes through the three links g, g 1 , h 1 . We may assume that this switching player is 3, because g ∈Q 2 means that Q 2 , the π-route of player 2, does not contain g. The definition of player set K and Claim 13 imply the following.
The fact that H 1 ⊆ Q 3 , g ∈Q ℓ ∩Q 2 ∩ Q 3 , and the maximality of |E(Q 2 ∩Q ℓ )| in Claim 14 enforce that Q 3 contains R 1 as an internal subpath (see Figures 4(a) and 5(a)). So
By Claims 14 and 17, H 1 ⊆ Q 2 ∩ Q 3 implies that in π both players 2 and 3 go through all links onQ 1 of load at least Λ − 2. Moreover, they jointly visit all links onQ ℓ of load at least Λ − 1 (by Claim 16). In view thatQ ℓ ⊆ Q 1 andQ 1 ∩Q j (j = 2, 3) bears π-load at most Λ − 3, the players 1, 2 and 3 would very likely form a coalition S to deviate if each of them experiences the highest π-load Λ. Player 1 has already satisfied the condition because its π-route Q 1 contains the most congested link e. The next two claims say that players 2 and 3 also satisfy the condition.
Claim 18. π 3 = Λ.
Proof. Observe thatQ 1 △Q 2 contains both P andQ 1 ∩Q 3 (cf. Figure 5 (c)), and E(Q 1 △Q 2 ) \ E(P ) \ E(Q 1 ∩Q 3 ) is contained in Q 3 (cf. Figure 5 In the proof of the next claim, we apply Proposition 2 to S = {1, 3}, where, as we have shown, players 1 and 3 experience highest π-load Λ. The fact that they do not deviate jointly enforces that player 2 also suffers from highest load. Notice thatQ 1 ∪Q 3 is contained in the link-disjoint union ofQ 1 \ E(H 1 ),Q 3 ∩ P , and H 1 ∪ (Q 1 ∩ Q 2 ) (cf. Figure 5(c) 
III. Trilateral deviation by bottleneck players
Having finished all necessary preparations, we are ready to show the final trilateral deviation by bottleneck players 1,2,3 suffering from the maximum laod π R = Λ.
Proof of Theorem 4.2. For the switching player 3 ∈ K (recall Claim 17), it can be deduced from Claim 13(iii) that Q 3 ∩Q ℓ is a path going through link g and node t ℓ (see Figure 5(b) ). In routing π ′ = π {1,2,3} (see Figure 5 (c)), players 2 and 3 have their π ′ -routesQ 2 andQ 3 intersect atQ 2 ∩Q 3 ⊆ P (possiblyQ 2 ∩Q 3 = ∅).
Since E(Q 1 ∩Q ℓ ) = ∅, we see that P ⊆Q ℓ is link-disjoint from π ′ -routeQ 1 of player 1 and therefore is contained in its π-route Q 1 . It follows that π ′ [f ] ≤ π[f ] + 1 for all links f ∈ P (cf. Figure 5(a,c) SinceQ 1 ∪Q 2 ∪Q 3 is link-disjoint union ofQ 2 ∩Q 3 ,Q 1 △Q 2 △Q 3 andQ 1 ∩ (Q 2 ∪Q 3 ), it follows from (4.17) -(4.19) that π ′ j ≤ Λ − 1 for j = 1, 2, 3. Recall from e ∈ Q 1 and Claims 18 and 19 that π j = Λ for j = 1, 2, 3, which together with the upper bound Λ − 1 on π ′ 1 , π ′ 2 , π ′ 3 yields a violation of Proposition 2 by S = {1, 2, 3}. This final contradiction shows that Assumption 1 is incorrect, and therefore establishes Theorem 4.2.
Conclusion
In this paper we have studied the selfish ring routing game for load balancing that allows coalitions among self-interested players (SRLC). Our main results show that the k-SPoA of SRLC is bounded above by 2 for all k ≥ 3, in contrast to its unbounded PoA = 2-SPoA = n − 1. This significant improvement on global efficiency is highly realizable in decentralized environments since players themselves are able to easily determine (say by enumeration) coalitions of size at most three whose deviation can make every member better off. This approach is particularly useful for large scale competitive games, where only small-scale communication and computation are realizable.
For future work, it is interesting to explore the weighted version of SRLC, where atomic selfish ring routing has to carry nonuniform traffic between different source-destination pairs. We believe that k-SPoA of SRLC with nonuniform traffic could also be upper bounded by some constant for all k ≥ 3. Our preliminary study shows that 3-SPoA is at most 6 when there are only two different weights. Other challenging direction is to investigate if the method could be extended to general networks, making good global balance via small coalitions and some other techniques.
